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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
BARBARA J. MOTES, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) CITATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
) AUTHORITY 
v. ) 
PRESTON J. MOTES, ) 
) Ckse No. 88-0015-CA 
Defendant/Respondent ) Priority No. 14b 
Cross-Appellant. ) 
* * * * * 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant submitted his brief on the 
16th of August, 1988. Thereafter, he became aware of a 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court, Mortensen v. Mortensen, 89 
Utah Adv. Reports 7, published on August 16, 1988. That 
decision is, respondent/cross-appellant believes, highly 
significant in regard to the issues presented to this court 
and, accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(j) of 
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, this authority is 
submitted to this court as supplemental authority dealing with 
Point III of respondent/cross-appellant' s brief as set forth 
on pages 19 through 21. 
In its pertinent point, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Mortensen v. Mortensen ruled that inherited property should 
be awarded to the spouse inheriting it during the course of 
the marriage, together with any appreciation or enhancement of 
its value, 8 9 Utah Adv. Reports at 9. However, the Court went 
on to declare 
. . . [U]nless (1) the other spouse has 
by his or her efforts or expense 
contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance or protection of that 
property, thereby acquiring an equitable 
interest in it. 
DuBois v. DuBois, supra, . . . . 
It is the position of Respondent/Cross-Appellant that this is 
the exception that applied to the instant matter and the trial 
court erred in not finding that the efforts of the Cross -
Appellant in managing the inherited property produced a 
substantial enhancement of that property in which he does have 
an equitable interest and which shoulp. have been awarded to 
him by the trial court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 f day of September, 
1988. 
a^^-^rs 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Cross-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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of the above and foregoing CITATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY, 
this 2-y day of September, 1988, to: 
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Attorney at Law 
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This is an appeal from the property distribution set forth in 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
entered on December 21, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(g)(1987) and 
Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISS9SS gfiggSflTEP ON APP^Ii 
1. May a trial court postpone dividing a pension fund and 
permit one spouse to use the income from the pension for support 
when: (a) an immediate division of the pension would leave one 
spouse without sufficient income to provide support for himself or 
his children; and (b) the other spouse has sufficient income and 
financial resources to justify postponing division of the pension? 
2. May a trial court order a custodial parent to execute 
documents necessary to permit the non-custodial parent to claim one 
or more of the parties' children as a tax exemption? 
3* Did the trial court err in finding that both the 
plaintiff s inheritance and the appreciation on that inheritance 
were non-divisible, separate property although the appreciation was 
a result of the defendant' s services? 
4. Should either party be awarded costs and attorneys' fees 
incurred as a result of this appeal? 
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i PROVISION, STftTTOgS. RTOPS M P jqSgTOVTIQffS 
26 U. S. C. § 1 5 2 ( e ) (1988) : 
(e) Support Test in Case of Child of Divorced Parents, etc. 
(1) Custodial parent gets exemption. --Except as 
otherwise provided in this subsection, if--
(A) a child (as defined in section 151(c)(3)) 
receives over half of his support during the 
calendar year from his parents--
(i) who are divorced or legally separated 
under a decree of divorce or separate 
maintenance. 
(ii) who are separated under a written 
separation agreement, or 
(iii) who live apart at all times during the 
last 6 months of the calendar year, and 
(B) such child is in the custody of one or both of 
his parents for more than one-half of the calendar 
year 
such child shall be treated, for purposes of subsection (a), 
as receiving over half of his support during the calendar year 
(hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the "custodial 
parent" ). 
(2) Exception where custodial parent releases claim to 
exemptions for the year. —A child of parents described in 
paragraph (1) shall be treated as having received over 
half of his support during a calendar year from the non-
custodial parent if--
(A) the custodial parent signs a written 
declaration (in such manner and form as the 
Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that such 
custodial parent will not claim such child as a 
dependent for any taxable year beginning in such 
calendar year, and 
(B) the non-custodial parent attaches such written 
declaration to the noncustodial parent' s return of 
the taxable year beginning during such calendar 
year. 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "noncustodial 
parent" means the parent who is not the custodial parent. 
(3) Exception for multiple-support agreement- . . . 
(4) Exception for certain pre-1985 instruments. . . . 
(5) Special rule for support received from new spouse of 
parent. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CAS^ g 
Th£ instant case was initiated by plaintiff s Verified 
Complaint for Divorce, which was filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on April 23, 
1986. Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce on 
March 19, 1987. The case was tried on July 30, 1987 before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District Court Judge. Defendant 
appeared in person and through counsel. Plaintiff appeared pro-se, 
as her counsel had withdrawn shortly before trial (R. 151; R. 239, 
Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 3). 
At the time of trial, the parties stipulated to division of 
the majority of household goods and personal property. In 
addition, the parties agreed to allege irreconcilable differences 
as the grounds for divorce and defendant agreed that custody of 
the parties' minor children could remain with the plaintiff. 
The principle issues that were contested at trial include: 
1. Division of the defendant' s military retirement; 
2. Division of the plaintiff s inheritance; and 
3. Award of child support and alimony. 
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The parties were the only witnesses called at trial. 
Testimony relevant to the issues now on appeal established the 
following facts: 
The defendant joined the United States Army, as a private, on 
June 21, 1960, and a year later obtained an appointment to the 
United States Military Academy at West Point (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 
1987, at p. 66). The defendant graduated from the military academy 
in June of 1965 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in engineering 
(R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at pp. 50-51). The parties were 
married on February 11, 1967, (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 
66). In 1977, while serving in the military, the defendant 
obtained a Masters of Business Administration from the University 
of Utah (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 50). 
Defendant retired from the military in June of 1984 (R. 239, 
Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 66). Upon retirement, defendant began 
receiving monthly payments from his military pension, which net him 
approximately $1,149.00 per month (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 
67), After leaving the military, he began working in the area of 
financial planning (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 69). Due to 
difficulties in establishing a clientele and generating a return on 
investments, at the time of the divorce the defendant' s business 
was operating at a net monthly loss of income (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 
1987, at pp. 90-91). The defendant's income also includes a monthly 
payment of $315.00 received pursuant to a contract for the sale of 
the parties' home in El Paso, Texas and approximately $11. 83 per 
month in interest and dividends (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 
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6). Thus, the defendant's net monthly income at the time of the 
divorce was approximately $1,475.83. The majority of that income is 
the income from the pension and, as the defendant testified, he 
needs that income to live (R. 239, Tr. July 27, 1987 at p. 72). 
The plaintiff completed her nursii^ g education and began 
working on her Master' s Degree during the parties' marriage (R. 
239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 191). At the time of trial, she was 
taking non-credit courses and estimated, at that rate, it would 
take her five or six years to finish the Master' s program (R. 2 39, 
Tr. July 30, 1987, at pp. 51-53). She started working for the 
University of Utah Medical Center in 1980. She is now a nursing 
supervisor at the University of Utah Medical Center, in charge of 
approximately 650 employees and she testified that her Master' s 
training would assist her in advancing in her career (R. 239, Tr. 
July 30, 1987, at pp. 52-56). The plaintiff had a gross monthly 
income of $2,205.00 and a net income of approximately $1,745.00 
(R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 6). 
In December of 1985, the plaintiff inherited approximately 
$100,000.00 (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 38). She gave 
$60,000.00 to the defendant to invest for the parties' children 
(R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 38). In February of 1985, 
plaintiff inherited approximately another $40,000.00 in cash (R. 
239, Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 41), and the defendant invested an 
additional $20, 000. 00. At the time of divorce, the $80, 000. 00 
invested by the defendant had increased to $112,384.00; a gain of 
$32,384.00 (R. 239, Tr. July 30, 1987 at p. 39 and 49). 
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The parties separated in April of 1986. At the time of 
trial, plaintiff was 44 years of age and defendant was 45 (R. 2 3 9, 
Tr. July 30, 1987, at p. 5). 
After hearing the parties' testimony, the trial court: 
1. Ordered the defendant to pay child support of $175.00 per 
month for each of the parties' three minor children for a total of 
$52 5, 00 (Findings and Conclusions at p. 6, para. 5; Decree at p. 
6, para. 5). 
2. Awarded each party $1.00 per year as alimony (Findings 
and Conclusions at p. 7, paraQ 9; Decree at page 3, para. 9). 
3. Ruled that both the $140,000.00 inherited by plaintiff 
and the $32,384.00 generated from the defendant' s investment of the 
inheritance were not assets of the marital estate. Therefore the 
funds were not divided between the parties (Findings and 
Conclusions at p. 12 and 15, paras. 26 and 37; Decree at pp. 3 and 
10-11, paras. 26 and 37). 
4. Ruled that division of the retirement benefits accrued by 
both plaintiff and defendant is postponed until defendant's 
support obligation is satisfied—after the parties' last child 
reaches the age of majority or graduates from high school (Findings 
and Conclusions at page 14, para 35; Decree at p. 10, para. 35). 
^The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in this 
case are pages 190-205 of the record on appeal. For the court' s 
convenience, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
attached to this brief as Exhibit "A" and are cited herein as 
"Findings and Conclusions." The Decree of Divorce, record pages 
206-219, is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and cited as "Decree." 
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5. Ruled that defendant should be permitted to take a tax 
exemption for the parties' youngest child and, therefore, ordered 
the plaintiff to execute the documents necessary to permit the 
defendant to claim that exemption (Findings and Conclusions at 
page 7, para. 6; Decree at p. 2, para 6). 
POINT I 
The trial court has broad discretion in fashioning division of 
a pension plan to facilitate an equitable division of property 
under the circumstances presented in each divorce proceeding. In 
the instant case, the income from tlje defendant' s pension 
constitutes the majority of the defendant's income. Without that 
income, the defendant will be unable to support himself or his 
children while he tries to establish a new career. On the other 
hand, the plaintiff s income and other financial resources are 
sufficient to permit her to support herself and her children 
without the pension income. Consequently the trial court did not 
err in postponing division of the pension until his child support 
obligation terminates and allowing the defendant to use the pension 
income until that time. 
POINT II 
As a general rule, the custodial parent is entitled to claim 
his or her children as tax exemptions unless a statutory exception 
to that rule allows the non-custodial parent to claim the 
exemptions. 26 U. S.C. §152(e). One of the statutory exceptions 
provides that a non-custodial parent may claim the exemptions if 
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the custodial parent executes a written waiver of the exemptions. 
2 6 U. S. C. §152(e)(2). Allowing a state court to order the 
custodial parent to execute such a waiver does not impair the goal 
behind the general rule, which is to relieve the Internal Revenue 
Service of the burden of having to resolve factual disputes between 
divorced parents to determine which is entitled to the exemptions. 
Further, if the state court makes its order conditional upon the 
non-custodial parent remaining current in child support, the order 
can further the interest of the state and the custodial parent in 
enforcing support obligations. Thus, a state court should be 
permitted to order a custodial parent to execute the waiver 
necessary to allow the non-custodial parent to claim a child as a 
tax exemption. 
POINT III 
The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to 
consider one spouse' s inheritance and the appreciation in that 
inheritance as property to be divided upon divorce when the other 
spouse did nothing to contribute to the appreciation. However, a 
spouse should not be discouraged from rendering services that will 
protect and enhance the other' s inheritance by being denied any 
interest in the appreciation of the inheritance attributable to 
such services. Thus, the trial court erred in refusing to consider 
the appreciation in the plaintiff s inheritance that is 
attributable to the defendant' s services. 
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POINT IV 
Fees and costs on appeal should be granted under Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-3(1984), when financial need of a party so dictates. 
In this case, the plaintiff is in a much better financial condition 
than defendant. Thus, plaintiff is not entitled to an award of 
attorneys' fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TBS TOA& CQPRT DXP EOT frBiyss ITS DJSCiumOff 
9Y ?QgT?QflXW? PI VISION QF Tffg PSFSSWANT g PgNglQN 
UNTIL THE DEFENDANT' S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
IS TEWffNfrTi;pf 
Plaintiff devotes much of her argument on the retirement fund 
issue to establishing that, under Utah law, the fund is property 
that must be considered by a trial court in determining what 
constitutes an equitable division of property. See Brief of 
Appellant at pp. 12-13. That argument is unnecessary for purposes 
of this appeal as that trial court ruled tjiat the pension fund is 
an asset that should be divided between the parties (R. 203; R. 
215). The defendant does not dispute that ruling and, in fact, 
conceded at trial that he was willing to give up his interest in 
the parties' house and to claim no interest in the funds inherited 
by the plaintiff during the marriage in return for being awarded 
his pension fund, because he needed the income from the pension to 
live and to provide support for his children (See R. 23 9, Tr. July 
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27, 1987 at pp. 31-32 and 71-72). Thus, although the defendant 
asked that the pension be awarded to him as an income stream and 
not divided as an asset, the defendant acknowledged that the court 
should consider the pension in determining an equitable property 
division. 
The real issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred 
in postponing division of the pension fund until termination of the 
defendant' s child support obligation. The plaintiff argues that, 
because the defendant' s interest in the pension was vested at the 
time of divorce and he was receiving monthly pension payments, the 
trial court was required, under Woodward v» Woodward, 656 P. 2d 431 
(Utah 1982) and Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P. 2d 199 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), to award the plaintiff one-half of 7/8ths of each monthly 
pension payment (approximately $645. 00 gross or $503.00 net) from 
and after the time of the divorce. Brief of Appellant at pp. 14-15, 
Neither Woodward or Marchant, nor the more recent pronouncements on 
the subject found in Maxwell v. Maxwell, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah 
Ct. App. May 6, 1988), Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P. 2d 1076 (Utah 
1988) and Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P. 2d 830 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) place 
such a restriction on the trial court's discretion in dividing a 
pension fund. 
Under Utah law, there is no question that retirement benefits, 
whether vested or not, "are a form of deferred compensation which a 
court should at least consider when dividing marital assets. '• 
Gardner, 748 P. 2d at 1078, As noted above, the defendant 
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acknowledged at trial that the court could consider his pension in 
determining how to divide the parties' assets. 
In Gardner, the Utah Supreme Court noted that a trial court 
has at its disposal many different methods of dividing a pension 
plan, any one of which may be appropriate depending upon the 
circumstances of the case. 748 P. 2d at 1079. For instance, the 
Court approved use of the Woodward formula, where other assets are 
inadequate to offset the value of the pension or the present value 
of the pension is impossible to calculate. Id. citing Woodward, 656 
P. 2d at 433. The Court also approved of a division method 
requiring the spouse awarded the pension to make yearly installment 
payments that compensate the other spouse for his or her equitable 
share of the fund, Id. citing Rayburn v. Rayburn, 748 P. 2d 238 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), or awarding the entire pension to the retired 
spouse and awarding property of equal value to the other spouse. 
Id. citing Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P. 2d 1308 (Utah 1982). In short, the 
Woodward formula is not the only method of dividing a pension fund. 
See Maxwell 82 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. 
The question remains: Did the trial court abuse its discretion 
by postponing division of the pension fund and considering the 
interim pension income in determining the defendant' s support 
obligation? The plaintiff argues that the court erred because the 
award is tantamount to postponing the income from a bank account 
and allowing one spouse to use the income therefrom for support-
essentially forcing the plaintiff to underwrite the defendant' s 
support obligation, which, the plaintiff infers, is obviously 
-11-
impermissible. Brief of Appellant at pp. 13-14. The Defendant 
disputes that it is per se error to postpone division of property 
to allow one spouse temporary use of that property. It is not 
uncommon for a court to award a home to one spouse although the 
other spouse is entitled to a share of the equity in the house that 
will not be satisfied until the home is sold. See e. g. Andersen 
v. Andersen, 85 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah Ct. App. June 22, 1988) 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that one spouse 
may be awarded a pension fund as a res from which alimony can be 
paid. Dogu, 652 P. 2d at 310. There is no reason for 
distinguishing this case and holding that a spouse may not be 
temporarily awarded pension income from which he can pay child 
support. 
The only real constraint on the trial court' s discretion in 
dividing a pension, especially in an unusual manner such as the 
method of division used in the case at bar, is that the trial court 
must set forth finding that justifies the method of division. See 
Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P. 2d at 833 (holding that, when it is 
impossible to determine the present value of a pension, division 
should be postponed until the spouse accumulating the pension is 
entitled to distribution thereof unless the court sets forth 
reasons for immediately dividing the pension along with other 
assets). 
In the instant case, the trial court found that the 
defendant' s net monthly income apart from the pension payment, was 
only a net of approximately $200.00 per month (Findings and 
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Conclusions at pp. 2-3, para. 7). The court found that the 
plaintiff has a gross monthly income of $2,205.00 and awarded the 
plaintiff her inheritance and the appreciation on that inheritance 
(Findings and Conclusions at pp. 10-11, para. 37). The court 
ordered the defendant to pay a total of $525. 00 per month as child 
support and noted that the amount was set taking into account the 
pension income that the defendant would receive (Findings and 
Conclusions at pp. 6 and 11, paras. 5 and 35). 
Those findings indicate that, if the pension income is 
immediately divided using the Woodward formula, the defendant will 
have a monthly income of approximately $850.00 and the plaintiff 
will take home approximately $2, 300. 00 per month, in addition to 
the income that she can earn off her sizable inheritance. 
Certainly, under that scenario, the defendant would not be able to 
provide any significant support for his children and may well be 
entitled to receive alimony from plaintiff to prevent him from 
becoming a public charge and allow him to live, as nearly as 
possible, in the manner that the parties enjoyed in their 17. 5 
years of marriage, financially supporting the family. That result 
would be less than equitable in view of the years of service 
rendered by the defendant. In short, the trial court postponed 
division of the pension to permit the defendant to use the income 
The plaintiff drilled the defendant on why a man with an 
ML B. A. and a degree in engineering could not make more money after 
retiring from the military. (R. 239, Tr. July 27, 1987 at p. 90. ) 
She did not suggest what he could do with his 20 year old West 
Point degree or his 10 year old M. B.A. to earn more money outside 
the military. 
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for a short time to begin a new career (something that he no doubt 
anticipated doing when he decided to stay in the military long 
enough to receive his pension), while still enabling him to provide 
support for his children - not an unjust result. 
If this Court determines that the trial court erred in not 
dividing the pension using Woodward formula and, at the same time, 
requires the defendant to meet the support obligation ordered by 
the trial court, the defendant will be left with approximately 
$300.00 per month upon which to live and the plaintiff will receive 
over $2,700.00. That result is obviously unfair. Thus, as the 
plaintiff acknowledges, see Brief of Appellant at p. 16, if the 
trial court orders immediate division of the pension income, this 
case should be remanded to the trial court for modification of the 
child support award and an award of alimony that will allow the 
defendant to live, as nearly as possible, in the style that he 
enjoyed prior to the divorce. 
POINT II 
A TRIAL COURT MAY ORDER A CUSTODIAL PARENT TO EXECUTE 
DQQTjmmS WgCflggART FQR T*JS flQNCiygTQDIAI, PARENT TQ gLA^M 
ONE OR MORE OF THE PARTIES' CHILDREN AS A TAX EXEMPTION. 
Almost a year after the instant case was decided, this Court, 
in Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P. 2d 69 (1988), ruled that a post-1985 
divorce decree did not constitute a "qualified pre-1985 instrument" 
pursuant to which a non-custodial parent can claim a tax exemption 
for his or her child under 26 0. S. C. §152(e)(4) (1988), although 
the divorce decree modified a pre-1985 stipulation that allowed the 
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non-custodial parent to take the exemptions. Id. at 72. The Court 
held that, because the non-custodial parent had not established 
that he fell within any of the statutory exceptions to the general 
rule that the custodial parent is also entitled to claim exemptions 
for the parties' children, the trial court erred in awarding tax 
exemptions to the non-custodial parent. Id. 
The existence of a "qualified pre-1985 instrument" that 
allocates a tax exemption to the non-custodial parent is not the 
only exception to the general rule that a custodial parent is 
entitled to claim the parties' children as a tax exemption. A non-
custodial parent is entitled to the exemption if: (1) the custodial 
parent signs a written declaration that he or she will not claim 
the child as an exemption; and (2) the non-custodial parent 
attaches that written declaration to his or her tax return. 26 
U. S. C. §152(e)(2). In short/ a non-custodial parent can claim an 
exemption if the custodian executes a written waiver of the right 
to claim the child. 
In interpreting and applying the waiver exception, state 
courts have established two lines of reasoning, which lead to 
opposite results. One line of reasoning simply finds that because a 
federal statute grants the exemptions to the custodial parent, 
state courts cannot change that result by ordering the custodial 
parent to execute a waiver of the exemption. Jensen v. Jensen, 753 
P. 2d 342, 345 (Nev. 1988)(holding that it is improper for a trial 
court to order the custodial parent to execute a waiver when the 
same economic result could be achieved by decreasing the non-
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custodial parent's support obligation); Lorenz v. Lorenz, 419 
N. W. 2d 770, 771 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a state court has 
no jurisdiction over which party can claim a child as a tax 
exemption but noting that, where the level of support was 
determined in conjunction with allowing the non-custodial parent to 
claim children as tax exemptions, it is appropriate for a trial 
court to decrease the amount of support if the non-custodial parent 
refuses to waive the exemptions). Davis v. Fair, 707 S. W. 2d 711 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (again holding that where a non-custodial parent 
is denied an exemption under 26 U. S. C. §152, it is appropriate to 
decrease the amount of support paid by that parent). 
The better view, and the view adopted by the majority of 
courts that have addressed the issue, is that, although a state 
court cannot award tax exemptions simply by ordering who is 
entitled to the exemptions, the court may order a custodial parent 
to execute the waiver necessary for a non-custodial parent to claim 
the exemptions under 26 U. So C. §152(e)(2). Hughes v. Hughes, 35 
Ohio 165; 518 N, E. 2d 1213 (1988); Pergolski v. Pergolski, 143 
Wis. 2d 166, 420 N. W. 2d 414 (Ct. App. 1988); Cross v. Cross, 363 
S. E. 2d 449 (W. Va. 1987); Theroux v. Boehmler (In re the Marriage of 
Theroux), 410 N. W. 2d 354 (Minn, Ct. App. 1987); Lincoln v. Lincoln, 
155 Ariz. 272, 746 P. 2d 13 (Ct. App. 1987); Fudenberg v. Moisted, 
390 N. W. 2d 19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). The reasoning behind that view 
is as follows: 
Prior to 1984, 26 U. S. C. §152(e) stated that the parent who 
provided the larger share of support to a child could claim the 
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child as an exemption and the non-custodial parent was presumed to 
provide the larger share of support if he or she paid more than 
$1,200.00 per year as child support. As a result of that rule, the 
Internal Revenue Service was forced to resolve disputes between 
parents over who actually provided more support for the child. In 
order to relieve the I. R. S. from the burden of resolving these 
domestic disputes, 26 U. S. C. §152(e) was amended to establish, 
conclusively, that the custodial parent is entitled to claim a 
child as an exemption, unless one of the statutory exceptions is 
present. See e.g. Pergolskl, 420 N. W. 2d at 417; Cross, 363 S. W. 2d 
at 449; Lincoln, 746 P. 2d at 16. Nowhere in the amended Section 
152(e) is a state court prohibited from ordering a party to execute 
the waiver necessary to allow a non-custodial parent to claim a 
child as an exemption under the exception provided in §152(e)(2). 
Allowing the state court to issue such an order does not impede the 
goal of the statute - the I. R. S. is still not required to resolve 
disputes about who is entitled to the exemption. See e. g. Cross, 
363 So E. 2d at 458-59. Further, such an order may promote the 
interest of the custodial parent. The state court can order the 
custodial parent to execute a waiver, only if the non-custodial 
parent remains current in his or her support obligations, which 
gives the custodial parent some leverage to assist in collecting 
past-due child support when the defaulting parent desires to file a 
tax return. See e. g. Cross, at 459-60. On the other hand, 
prohibiting a trial court from issuing such an order may prevent 
the court from promoting the parties' interest by awarding the 
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exemption to the party with the highest income - rendering more 
disposable income available for support of the parties and their 
children. Id at 460. 
In short, permitting a state court to order a custodial 
parent to execute the waiver necessary to allow a non-custodial 
parent to claim a child as an exemption does not conflict with 
federal law and may promote the interest of the state and the 
custodial parent in enforcing a child support obligation. 
Consequently, a trial court should be permitted to order a 
custodial parent to execute the waiver required to allow the non-
custodial parent to claim a child as a tax exemption. 
In the instant case, the defendant was awarded an exemption 
for one of the parties' children, so long as he is current in his 
child support payments, and the plaintiff was ordered to execute 
the documents required by the I. R. S. to effectuate that award 
(Decree at p. 2, para. 6). In accord with the points and 
authorities presented above, that order should be affirmed. 
Alternatively, if this Court finds that the trial court cannot 
order the defendant to execute a waiver of the tax exemption, the 
case should be remanded to permit an adjustment in child support to 
reflect the loss of disposable income that the defendant will incur 
by losing the tax exemption. 
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POINT I I I 
Tflg APPRECIATION IN MCOTSY INHERITED 3Y QNg ggQggg DgfiJNg A MAfiRlAgg 
SBQVIiP BE CONSIDERED IN PSTERfflNINC AN EOmTABftE DIVISION 
OF PROPERTY IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING WHEN THE 
APPRECIATION is ppg TO THE SERVICE RENDERED BY THE Q ^ E R $PQOgEy 
In the instant case, the uncontroverted evidence indicates 
that during the marriage, the plaintiff gave the defendant 
$80,000.00 of the $140,000.00 she inherited and the defendant 
invested that money and generated a return of approximately 
$32,384.00 (R. 239; Tr. July 27, 1987 at pp. 48-49 and 69). 
Consistent with that evidence, the trial court ruled that the 
$32,384.00 was attributable, in part, to the defendant' s services. 
Yet the trial court ruled that the $32, 384. 00 was not a marital 
asset that was subject to division between the parties (Findings 
and Conclusions at p. 5, 12 and 15, paras. 14, 26 and 37). 
The general rule of law governing division of one spouse7 s 
inheritance in a divorce proceeding is that it "may be viewed as 
separate property, and in appropriate circumstances, equity will 
require that each party retain the separate property. . . . However 
the rule is not invariable." Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 135 
(Utah 1987). In determining whether it is appropriate to divide an 
inheritance in a divorce proceeding, a trial court must consider a 
number of factors including the factors that must be considered 
when dividing any property, marital or otherwise, such as: the type 
of property involved, the length of the marriage; and the parties7 
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respective financial position. Id. A trial court may award one 
spouse his or her entire inheritance and the appreciation thereto 
if the award is equitable, especially if the other spouse has not 
contributed to the appreciation in the property. Id. at 136; see 
also Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P. 2d 1276 (Utah 1987) (holding that 
a trial court properly awarded one spouse the amount that she 
invested into the parties' home from her inheritance, in view of 
the fact that the appreciation in the house was divided equally 
between the parties). 
However, "of particular concern" in a case in which an 
inheritance and associated appreciation is at issue is "whether one 
spouse has made any contribution toward the growth" of the other 
spouse' s inherited property. Burke, 733 P. 2d at 135. Thus, where 
the parties' property consists primarily of gifts obtained from one 
spouse' s parents and the appreciation on those gifts earned through 
investments made by the other spouse, it is appropriate to consider 
the appreciation as marital property that should be divided between 
the parties. See Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P, 2d 1380, 
1381 (1973). 
In the instant case, the circumstances dictate that, at 
minimum, the appreciation on the plaintiff s inheritance that is 
attributable to the defendant' s investments should have been 
considered as property to be divided between the parties. The 
facts in this case indicate that the plaintiff has only a 
Volkswagen Jetta to show for the $60, 000o 00 that she inherited but 
did not give the plaintiff to invest* She could not account for the 
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remainder of the funds. Yet, the $80,000.00 invested by the 
defendant earned a return of almost 50% leaving the plaintiff with 
over $110,000.00 at the time of the divorce. Certainly, a spouse 
should not be discouraged from protecting and enhancing property 
that the other spouse receives through gifts, inheritance or 
otherwise by being denied the benefit of his or her services if the 
marriage ends in divorce. 
The impracticality and inequity that would result if, as a 
general rule, a spouse is not entitled to share in appreciation of 
the other spouse' s property when the appreciation is attributable 
to his or her services, is compounded in the instant case. In this 
case, the plaintiff s inheritance came towards the end of a long 
I 
marriage, after the most valuable separate property of the 
defendant, his West Point degree, had largely been expended and had 
allowed the parties' to acquire an estate worth nearly $200, 000. 00. 
As a result of the late inheritance, the plaintiff leaves the 
marriage with very good financial resources, while the defendant' s 
resources are only moderate—at a time when he is trying to start a 
new career. 
Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in refusing 
to consider the appreciation in the plaintiff s inheritance as an 
asset which should be considered in dividing property between the 
parties. 
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POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS' FgSg FOR TfflCS A??gAft, 
The plaintiff correctly argues that Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 
(1984) authorizes a court to award attorney's fees in a divorce 
action and that this may include attorney' s fees for an appeal. 
However, as this Court has ruled, an award of attorney' s fees under 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 must be "based on evidence of both 
financial need of the party and the reasonableness of the fee 
awarded* " Andersen v. Andersen, 85 Utah Adv., Rep. at 19. As noted 
above, the plaintiff leaves the parties' marriage in a much better 
financial position than does the defendant. She has both a higher 
monthly income than the defendant and, thanks to her inheritance, a 
much greater financial reserve. Under these circumstances, if there 
is to be an award of attorney' s fees, it should be to the 
defendant. 
Plaintiff erroneously argues that she is entitled to 
attorney' s fees because the defendant urged the trial court to 
award him his retirement as an "income stream". As indicated in 
Point I infra the defendant conceded that the pension should be 
considered in a division of the parties' property and in fact 
offered to give up his interest in the parties' home and the 
appreciation in the plaintiff s inheritance if he was awarded the 
pension as an income stream because he needed the income to live. 
The trial court ruled that the pension was indeed an asset subject 
-22-
to division between the parties but postponed division of the fund 
to allow the defendant to use the income to support himself and his 
children - an equitable determination that fell somewhere between 
what the defendant and the plaintiff had requested. 
The plaintiff s argument that there is some reason to award 
attorney's fees on the basis of the defendant's cross-appeal is 
simply incomprehensible. Attorney' s fees should not be awarded 
where one party appeals in good faith. See e. g. In the Matter of 
the Marriage of Milanovich, 697 P. 2d 927, 928 (Mont, 1985), In 
this case, the defendant decided to ask the Court to rule on 
division of the appreciation in the inheritance only after the 
plaintiff had already appealed the case to this court. The law in 
Utah is unclear on division of appreciation in the property of one 
spouse that is attributable to the services of the other spouse. 
Moreover, the law that exists indicates that such appreciation 
should be considered as property to be divided between the parties. 
Consequently, the plaintiff s request for fees and costs on 
appeal should be denied. 
CQNCLPSICW 
Based upon the foregoing points and authorities, the 
defendant respectfully requests that this court: 
(1) Affirm the trial court's ruling, which postpones division 
of the defendant's pension until his child support obligation 
terminates; and 
(2) Affirm the trial court's order awarding defendant a tax 
exemption for one of the parties' children and requiring the 
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plaintiff to execute the documents necessary to effectuate that 
order; or, 
If this court reverses the trial court's ruling on either the 
pension or the tax exemption, defendant requests that this case be 
remanded to the trial court for a modification of support and 
alimony that will leave the defendant with sufficient income to 
support himself. 
In addition, the defendant requests that this court reverse 
the trial court's determination that the appreciation in 
plaintiff s inheritance is not property that should be divided 
between the parties and remand the case to the trial court for an 
equitable division of the appreciation. 
Finally, the defendant requests that plaintiff s request for 
fees and costs on appeal be denied. 
DATED this 16th day of August, 1988. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
H I D DAVID S. IDOLOWITZ 
JULIE A. BRYAN 
Attorneys for Respondent/Cross 
Appellant 
-24-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of August, 1988, I 
caused to be mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing, 
postage prepaid, to: 
KENT M. KASTING 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
310 South Main 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(td/jab/mot«j.brl) 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BARBARA MOTES, 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. D86-1615 
PRESTON MOTES, ) 
) Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
trial on Thursday, the 30th day of July, 1987, the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup presiding. The plaintiff was present in person, 
representing herself. The defendant was present in person and 
represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The court discussed 
the issues with the parties to see what could be resolved by 
agreement, then heard and considered the testimony of the par-
ties, examined the exhibits offered by the parties, and, being 
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following as 
its 
^HIBITA 
PILED IN CLERKS O ^ i C E 
Salt Lake CounW ' i*ah 
uooiso 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were both residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on the date this action was filed and each 
had been so for more than three months immediately prior thereto. 
2. The parties are husband and wife, having been mar-
ried February 11, 1967, in Ardmore, Pennsylvania* 
3. There have been four children born as issue of 
this marriage, three of whom, Kimberly, age 16, born October 19, 
1970; Tamara, age 14, born October 5, 1972; and Charissa, age 13, 
born December 27, 1973, are minors. 
4. The parties agreed that care, custody and control 
of the minor children of the parties should be awarded to the 
plaintiff, subject to liberal rights of visitation by the 
defendant. 
5. The plaintiff is 44 years of age, is presently 
employed as a nursing supervisor, where she supervises more than 
650 employees at the University of Utah Hospital and earns a 
gross income of $2,205.00 per month. 
6. The plaintiff acquired her nursing education dur-
ing the course of the marriage. 
7. The defendant is 45 years of age, a graduate of 
the United States Military Academy at West Point and has an 
M.B.A. earned from the University of Utah acquired during the 
marriage. He is presently retired from the United States Mili-
tary and receives $1,484.00 a month as retirement pay. In 
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addition, he receives $315.00 a month as payment on a note for 
the sale of property owned by the parties in El Pasof Texas, and 
has earned, on an average basis, commissions from his employer, 
Waddell & Reed, as a financial planner, $248.00 a month. He has 
incurred expenses in conducting his business at Waddell & Reed of cuitfu^u 
A 
$330,00 a month. 
8. In February, 1985, the plaintiff's father died. 
When the parties went to the home that he had occupied, they 
found and removed from the home $30,000.00 in cash. The 
plaintiff's father made plaintiff his sole heir and she has 
inherited the said $30,000.00 in cash at the time of her father's 
death, $100,000.00 in December, 1985; $7,500.00 in November, 
1986; and $3,000.00 in December, 1986, for a total of 
$140,500.00. The estate has not been finally distributed, but 
most of it has been disbursed. 
9. After the parties removed the $30,000.00 from the 
plaintiff's father's home, $20,000.00 was given to the defendant 
by the plaintiff to invest for their children and accounts were 
opened up in the sum of $5,000.00 for each of the four children 
*of the parties. After the $100,000.00 payment had been 
received, an additional $10,000.00 was set aside for each of the 
children of the parties. There are, now, $15,000.00 plus earn-
ings in the accounts of each of the children of the parties for a 
total of $60,000 plus earnings. 
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10• The parties acquired a home and real property at 
1516 South Wasatch Drivef Salt Lake, City, Utah, in which they 
have accumulated an equity of^flOOj423i00; a note from the sale of 
property in El Paso, Texas, valued at $35,000*00; IRA accounts, 
in the United Funds, $17,350.00; Continental, $8,000.00; 
Magelland Fund, $19,083.00; stock accounts in the Fidelity Des-
tiny Fund, $41,263.00; shares of stock in AT&T and the other Bell 
companies plus accumulated reinvested dividends presently valued 
at $3,800.00; an account at Wilson-Davis for various penny stocks 
valued at $50.00; a 1980 Oldsmobile, valued at^flQO lOO; a 1982 
Volvo automobile, valued" at/ ^ ^ m ^ g w ; a 1986 Jetta automobile, 
valued at^$7,000.00j/ a fund for payment of taxes in the Vanguard 
Fund of $1,149.00; and an Army Mutual Aid Insurance Policy with a 
present cash value of $3,100.00. 
11. The plaintiff has a retirement account through her 
-tea, 
employment at the University of Utah Hospital with a proo<mt 
vjjiXuQ ef $5,129.00; her own checking account at the Credit Union 
for the balance of $7,6 80.00, and a Pentagon Credit Union Account 
with a balance of $3,721.00. 
12. The defendant has a savings account at the Air 
Defense Center Credit Union of $375.00; a checking account 
through the Air Defense Center Credit Union of $1,0 00.00; a Pen-
tagon Credit Union Account of $275.00; and checking account at 
First Security Bank of $500.00. 
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13. The parties have fought for a substantial period 
of time and have demonstrated that there are irreconcilable dif-
ferences between them in terms of their goals, values and how 
they treat each other, which make continuation of their marriage 
relationship impossible. 
14. The defendant invested a portion of the money 
inherited by the plaintiff and J M * investments have produced 
earnings ^  $32,384.00. 
15. Both of the parties disposed of assets during the 
pendency of this matter. 
16. The plaintiff is presently enrolled in school, as 
well as being employed and hopes to obtain a Master's Degree 
which she believes will be necessary to further her nursing 
career. 
17. The court discussed with the parties division of 
their personal property from a list prepared by the defendant and 
they agreed to divide the personal items between them as is here-
inafter set out. ^ u*. . ^ 
18. The plaintiff desires that her/name be ohdngod to 
Barbara Van Asdlan. 
19. Each of the parties employed counsel to represent 
them in this matter. Counsel for the plaintiff withdrew shortly 
before the trial and the plaintiff chose to represent herself, 
rather than employ new counsel. 
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From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now 
makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from the other, said Decrees to become final upon entry* 
2. Care, custody and control of the minor children of 
the parties should be awarded to the plaintiff, subject to lib-
eral rights of visitation by the defendant. 
3. The defendant and the children are to work out 
their own visitation arrangements upon 24-hour advance notice 
with which the plaintiff should not interfere* 
4. Each of the parties should be enjoined and prohib-
ited from dgmitfoiJjHj the other to the children or taking any 
action to involve the children in their disputes. Each should be 
supportive of the other as the parent of the children. 
5. The defendant should be ordered to pay the sum of 
$175.00 per child per month as child support for each of the 
children until that child attains the age of 18 and/or graduates 
from high school with his or her age-appropriate class. The 
defendant should be enioined from placing any initials or com-
ments on the checks.^ One-half of the child support should be 
paid on or before the 5th of each month and one-half should be 
paid on or before the 20th of each month. This order regarding 
child support should become effective August 1, 1987. 
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000 L'JZ 
6. The defendant should be awarded the youngest child ,0 
Ktf« TP^JI^A &** CHAtoiJr^ ~ife tf*«fr*+iX&$.VIA* CM* ,****• 
of the parties, Charissa, as his tax dependentJand the plaintiff^ ^  ^ 
should be ordered to sign all documents required by the Internal "** (p*^ 
Revenue Service to effect this award, 
7. All child support payments from and after the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter should be made 
through the clerk of the Salt Lake County Court. 
8. A withhold and deliver order should be authorized 
to be executed should the defendant fall more than 30 days behind 
in the payment of his child support. 
9. Each of the parties is awarded $1.00 per year as 
alimony from the other• 
10. Each of the parties should be ordered to retain 
their existing life insurance policies for the minor children of 
the parties until child support for the youngest child 
terminates. 
11. Each party should be ordered to maintain such 
health, accident, dental, orthodontic and hospital insurance as 
they have available to them through their employment for the ben-
efit of the minor children of the parties for so long as they may 
provide such insurance protection under the terms and conditions 
of the applicable insurance policies and each, should be ordered 
to pay one-half of any uninsured medical,/ dental, hospital or 
orthodontic expenses. 
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12, The plaintiff should have her name s^hqfcugp&cb. to the 
name of Van Asdlan. 
13* Each of the parties should be ordered to sign all 
documents and take all actions necessary to effect the provisions 
of the Decree of Divorce. 
14. The agreement of the parties regarding division of 
their personal property should be accepted by the court and, 
accordingly, the defendant is awarded, and the plaintiff should 
be ordered to deliver to the defendant, the following items: 
a. The bedroom set located in the master bed-
room, including the king-sized bed, chest, dresser, mirrors and 
nightstands; 
b. One of the large down comforters; 
c. His West Point blanket; 
d. The two table lamps with the tripod-type 
base; 
e. The sofa and loveseat located in the family 
room; 
f. The glass-topped table in the family room 
used as an endtable for the sofa; 
g. The clay table lamp on the glass-topped 
table; 
h. The large Sand painting given as a birthday 
present to the defendant; 
i. The Frace eagle over the fireplace; 
j. The Ray Harm eagle print; 
k. The silver West Point plate; 
1. The two pen and ink drawings of Landstuhl; 
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ra. The West Point print; 
n. The "Old Man" painting; 
p. Six of the etchings; 
q. The Merimbege River painting; 
r. Two of the Hughes paintings; 
s. Two large Sansui speakers; 
t. Two channel tape drive; 
u. Two Kenwood speakers; 
v* Pioneer tuner; 
w. Phonograph turntable; 
x. AKAI tapedeck (two channel); 
y. Two of the three wall clocks; 
2. Apple computer, printer and software; 
aa* The flower set of Franciscan china; 
bb« The Sango china; 
cc« The set of Nachmann whisky beakers; 
dd. The Rosenthal crystal; 
ee, Copper pots and pans; 
ff. Pewterware; plates, cups, goblets, pitcher, 
gg. Table linens to include one of the Army-Navy 
hh. Desk in the laundry room; 
iie The old green table from "Pops;" 
jj. One cardtable with one round piece of glass 
and one rectangular piece; 
kk. The Flokoti rugs and brass samovar; 
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steins; 
tableclothes; 
CKJOI'JG 
11. The National Geographic books and magazines 
and the bookcase in the study; 
mm. Handtools and power tools; 
nn. The aquarium; 
oo. All of Defendant's personal clothing and 
items, including uniforms; 
pp. All items purchased by Defendant before mar-
riage to include textbooks and records; 
qq. Remainder of the flatware set; 
rr. Balance of Defendant's business records. 
ss. Large china hutch obtained from P. D. 0. in 
Germany; 
15. The plaintiff should be specifically awarded 
a. The Gieol painting; 
b. Two Bassett paintings; 
c« The four-channel tape drive; 
d. Two bookcase speakers (Pioneer); 
e. SANSUI tuner; 
fo Grundig console and six speakers; 
g. AKAI tape deck (larger); 
h. Cassette deck; 
i. One of the three wall clocks; 
j. Pewter candlesticks; 
k. French hutch; 
1. Twelve Hummel figurines; 
m. One set of tools for use around the house ia hn,,c
^ &i%} # 
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16. The defendant should be ordered to make available 
to the plaintiff any records that the plaintiff shall request so 
that they can be reproduced on a c a s s e t t ^ ^ / r f ^ ^ ^ 
^^ ' 17, Each of the parties should be awarded all items of 
personal^ property in his/her possession not hereinabove 
specified* 
18. The defendant should be ordered to make available 
to the plaintiff any pictures, photographs or slides which she 
wishes duplicated and those will be duplicated at her expense. 
19. The plaintiff should be awarded all of the 
accounts of the children established with funds from the 
plaintiff's inheritance and the right and obligation to manage 
those accounts, and the defendant should be ordered to take 
appropriate steps to turn those over to the plaintiff. 
20. All right, title and interest in the home on 
Wasatch Drive should be awarded to the plaintiff, free of any 
interest of the defendant, subject to her payment of the first 
mortgage and payment of the debt and obligation of approximately 
$4,000.00 due to the Pentagon Credit Union and approximately 
$3,500.00 to the Norwest Credit Union. The plaintiff should be 
responsible for these obligations from and after August 1, 1987, 
and should be ordered to hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
21. The Trinidad note should be awarded to the defen-
dant, free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff. 
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22. Each of the parties should be awarded one of the 
Horizon lots which have no present value. 
23. The defendant should be awarded the interest of 
the parties in the United funds IRA Account; the Fidelity Destiny 
Fund; the Wilson-Davis Account; the Army Mutual Aid Insurance 
Policy; the- Air Defense Center Savings account; the Air Defense 
Center checking account; his Pentagon Credit Union account; and 
Defendant's First Security checking account. 
24. The plaintiff should be awarded the Continental 
IRA account; the Magellan fund; the family AT&T stock; her 
accounts at the University of Utah Credit Union; and Plaintifffs 
Pentagon Credit Union account. 
25. The defendant should be awarded the 1980 
Oldsmobile and the plaintiff should be awarded the 1982 Volvo and 
the 1986 Jetta. * 
26. Thef$32,384.00 earned by tohoidefendant through hicr 
N ^ ' 6TKV 
Tnar^ ps3!re?rt—o£l the property inherited by the plaintiff should be 
considered a non-asset of the marriage. 
27. The defendant shall obtain from Sears a statement 
of the account balance due as of May lf 1986. He is credited 
with having paid $140.00 on that account. Each of the parties 
shall be obligated to pay one-half of that account balance. If, 
after deduction of the $140.00 paid by the defendant, there is 
any money due below $140.00, that should be paid by the plain-
tiff. If the amount due, after credit of the $140.00 is more 
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than $140.00, the defendant should pay that sum to the plaintiff 
or judgment shall be entered in her favor for one-half of the 
balance over $280.00. If the defendant, by paying $140.00 shall 
have paid more than one-half of the amount that was due on May 1, 
1986, the amount by which he has exceeded payment of one-half of 
the balance due should be a credit against the child support he 
shall have been ordered to pay. 
28. If there are orthodontic bills due which have not 
been paid by insurance, each of the parties should pay one-half 
of that unpaid balance and one-half of any counseling bills 
incurred for and on behalf of the children. If there is a bill 
for counseling for the defendant, he should pay it himself. 
29. The defendant should be ordered to pay the obliga-
tions due to MasterCharge and First Security Bank and to hold the 
plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
30. Each of the parties should assume, pay and hold 
the other harmless from any debts or obligations incurred since 
their separation. 
31. Each of the parties should assume and pay their 
own costs and fees as incurred in this matter. 
32* The request of the plaintiff that her fees be paid 
by the defendant should be denied, as she has substantial 
resources of her own to pay her own fees. 
33. The defendant should be ordered to verify that all 
of the checks he testified he has transmitted to the plaintiff 
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shall have cleared the bank and been paid to her. If he deter-
mines that they have not cleared the bank, then, he should be 
ordered to put stop orders against those checks and write 
replacement checks. 
34. Each of the parties should be enjoined and prohib-
ited from physically abusing, harassing, bothering, or attempting 
to intimidate the other in any way, wherever they may be or 
reside. 
35. The court, recognizing that the plaintiff claims 
that the military retirement pay of the defendant is an asset 
which should be divided which is disputed by the defendant who 
contends that the fund is an income stream, not an asset because 
it is being paid to him, and that the court has determined that 
the defendant receives $1,484.00 as retirement pay (upon which tne 
court has set the child support obligation of the defendant in 
light of that obligation as well as the fact that the plaintiff 
has accrued a retirement account through the State of Utah which 
has a present value of $5,129.00 rules final disposition as to an 
award regarding either of the retirement accounts of the parties 
should be reserved until the obligation to pay child support 
terminates. 
36. The court declares that it believes that it has 
divided the property of the parties with/$87,707.00 being awarded 
to the plaintiff and/$99,913.00 being awarded to the defendant^ 
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and the extra amount has been awarded to the defendant for finan-
cial services provided to the plaintiff and the marital estate, 
37. The court has determined that it should award to 
the plaintiff the funds that she has inherited without counting 
that as
 #part of the marital estate, although the defendant has 
requested that this be included for consideration purposes and 
that part of it, that is, the money that has been earned from the 
inheritance^through the management of the defendant be considered 
as a marital asset. 
DATED this 94 "~~ day of ftyJ^Wv , 1937. 
KfeNNETH RIGTRUI 
District Court Judge 
d - \ • « * . » - ' « • 
H. DIXON H1NOLEY 
By 
CLERK ' /} 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following on this /ft day of 
September, 1987: 
Ms. Barbara Van Asdlan 
1516 South Wasatch Drive 
Salt Lake Cityy_Utah 
j^\~~iyj^^c^/ 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ ^J 
DSD:080487K 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
FiLED IN CLERK'S OFP'CE 
S a l t L a * ^ ('".-.i•<-!+< > *tah 
DEC 211987 
H Dixon Hmdiev^ierk 3rd\pisi/youri 
Deputy Cierj Y 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BARBARA J. MOTES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRESTON J. MOTES, 
Defendant. 
^ k SL\3 HO bSTl 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D86-1615 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
* * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
trial on Thursday, the 30th day of July, 1987, the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup presiding. The plaintiff was present in person 
and representing herself. The defendant was present in person 
and represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The court dis-
cussed the issues with the parties to see what could be resolved 
by agreement, then heard and considered the testimony of the par-
ties, examined the exhibits offered by the parties, and, being 
advised in the premises, and having made and entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
EXHIBIT B 00i)2(;G 
1. Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce 
from the other, said Decree to become final upon entry. 
2. Care, custody and control of the minor children of 
the parties is awarded to the plaintiff, subject to liberal 
rights of visitation by the defendant. 
3. The defendant and the children shall work out 
their own visitation arrangements upon 24-hour advance notice 
with which the plaintiff shall not interfere. 
4. Each of the parties is enjoined and prohibited 
from donjfcgatLrfg the other to the children or taking any action to 
involve the children in their disputes. Each shall be supportive 
of the other as the parent of the children. 
5. The defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $175.00 
per child per month as child support for each of the children 
until that child attains the age of 18 and graduates from high 
school with his or her age-appropriate class. The defendant is 
enjoined from placing any initials or comments on the checks. 
One-half of tne child support shall be paid on or before the 5th 
of each month and one-half shall be paid on or before the 20th of 
each month. This order regarding child support shall become 
effective August 1, 1987. 
6. The defendant is awarded the youngest child of the o^ t-< 
parties, Charissa, as his tax dependent,^and the plaintiff i s ^ ^ F ^ 
ordered to sign all documents required by the Internal Revenue (f**^**} 
Service to effect this award. 
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7. All child support payments from and after the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter shall be made 
through the clerk of the Salt Lake County Court. 
8. A withhold and deliver order is authorized to be 
executed^ should the defendant fall more than 30 days behind in 
the payment of his child support. 
9. Each of the parties is awarded $1.00 per year as 
alimony from the other. 
10. Each of the parties is ordered to retain their 
existing life insurance policies for the minor children of the 
parties until child support for the youngest child terminates. 
11. Each party is ordered to maintain such health, 
accident, dental, orthodontic and hospital insurance as they have 
available to them through their employment for the benefit of the 
minor children of the parties for so long as they may provide 
such insurance protection under the terms and conditions of the 
applicable insurance policies and each is ordered to pay one-half 
of any uninsured medical,/ dental, hospital or orthodontic 
expenses. ^ 
12. The plaintiff should be Gh^ngod to the name of Van 
Asdlan. 
13. Each of the parties is ordered to sign all docu-
ments and take all actions necessary to effect the provisions of 
this Decree of Divorce. 
14. The agreement of the parties regarding division of 
their personal property should be accepted by the court and, 
accordingly, the defendant is awarded, and the plaintiff should 
be ordered to deliver to the defendant, the following items: 
a. The bedroom set located in the master bed-
room, including the king-sized bed, chest, dresser, mirrors and 
nightstands; 
b. One of the large down comforters; 
c« His West Point blanket; 
d. The two table lamps with the tripod-type 
base; 
room; 
e. The sofa and loveseat located in the family 
f. The glass-topped table in the family room 
used as an endtable for the sofa; 
g. The clay table lamp on the glass-topped 
table; 
h. The large Sand painting given as a birthday 
present to the defendant; 
i. The Frace eagle over the fireplace; 
j* The Ray Harm eagle print; 
k. The silver West Point plate; 
1. The two pen and ink drawings of Landstuhl; 
m. The West Point print; 
n. The "Old Man" painting; 
p. Six of the etchings; 
qe The Merimbege River painting; 
r. Two of the Hughes paintings; 
s. Two large Sansui speakers; 
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t# Two channel tape drives; 
u« Two Kenwood speakers; 
v. Sansui tuner; 
w. Phonograph turntable; 
x. La Caille tapedeck (two channel); 
y. Two of the three wall clocks; 
z. Apple computer, printer and software; 
aa. The flower set of Franciscan china; 
bb. The Sango china; 
cc. The set of Nachmann whisky beakers; 
dd. The Rosenthal crystal; 
ee. Copper pots and pans; 
ff. Pewterware; 
gg. Table linens to include one of the Army-Navy 
tableclothes; 
hh. Desk in the laundry room; 
ii. The old green table from "Pops;" 
jj. One cardtable with one round piece of glass 
and one rectangular piece; 
kk. The Flokoti rugs and brass samovar; 
11. The National Geographic books and magazines 
and the bookcase in the study; 
mm. Handtools and power tools; 
nn. The aquarium; 
oo. All of Defendant's personal clothing and 
items, including uniforms; 
pp. All items purchased by Defendant before mar-
riage to include textbooks and records; 
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qq. Remainder of the flatware set; 
rr. Balance of Defendant's business records. 
ss* Large china hutch obtained from P. D. 0. in 
Germany; 
15. The plaintiff is specifically awarded 
a. The Gieol painting; 
b. Two Bassett paintings; 
c. The four-channel tape drive; 
d. Two bookcase speakers (Pioneer); 
e. SANSUI tuner; 
f. Grundig console and six speakers; 
g. AKAI tape deck (larger); 
ho Cassette deck; 
ic One of the three wall clocks; 
jo Pewter candlesticks; 
k. French hutch; 
1. Twelve Hummel figurines; and ^ „ « 
m. One set of tools for use around the house/. ^ ^ 
16. The defendant shall make available to the plain-
tiff any records that the plaintiff shall request so that they 
can be reproduced on a cassette,**'. ff^Z ^ ^ " >%*yr^ ^ ^ > ^ ; 
J 17, Each of the parties is awarded all items of per-
sonal property in his/her possession not hereinabove specified. 
-6-
000 
18. The defendant is ordered to make available to the 
plaintiff any pictures, photographs or slides which she wishes 
duplicated and those will be duplicated at her expense. 
19. The plaintiff is awarded all of the accounts of 
the children established with funds from the plaintifffs inheri-
tance and the right and obligation to manage those accounts, and 
the defendant is ordered to take appropriate steps to turn those 
over to the plaintiff. 
20. All right, title and interest in the home on 
Wasatch Drive is awarded to the plaintiff, free of any interest 
of the defendant, subject to her payment of the first mortgage 
and payment of the debt and obligation of approximately $4,000.00 
due to the Pentagon Credit Union and approximately $3,500.00 to 
the Norwest Credit Union. The plaintiff shall be responsible for 
these obligations from and after August 1, 1987, and she is 
ordered to hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
21. The Trinidad note is awarded to the defendant, 
free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff. 
22. Each of the parties is awarded one of the Horizon 
lots which have no present value. 
23. The defendant is awarded the interest of the par-
ties in the United funds IRA account, the Fidelity Destiny Fund, 
the Wilson-Davis Account; the Army Mutual Aid Insurance Policy, 
the Air Defense Center Savings account, the Air Defense Center 
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checking account, his Pentagon Credit Union account and his First 
Security checking account. 
24. The plaintiff is awarded the Continental IRA 
account, the Magellan fund, the family AT&T stock, and her 
accounts at the University of Utah Credit Union and plaintiff's 
Pentagon Credit Union account. 
25. The defendant is awarded the 1980 Oldsmobile and 
the plaintiff is awarded the 1982 Volvo and the 1986 Jetta. 
26. The/$32,384.00 earned by^tho dofondant through ^ io 
Baafl&gomen*4o£ the property inherited by the plaintiff is not con-
sidered an asset of the marriage. 
27. The defendant shall obtain from Sears a statement 
of the account balance due as of May 1, 1986. He is credited 
with having paid $140.00 on the account. Each of the parties 
shall be obligated to pay one-half of the account balance as of 
May 1, 1986. If, after deduction of the $140.00 paid by the 
defendant, there is a balance due of less than $140.00, it shall 
be paid by the plaintiff. If the amount due, after credit of the 
$140.00 is more than $140.00, the defendant shall pay that sum to 
the plaintiff or judgment shall be entered in her favor for 
one-half of the balance over $280.00. If the defendant, by pay-
ing $140.00 shall have paid more than one-half of the amount that 
was due on May 1, 1986, the amount by which he has exceeded pay-
ment of one-half of the balance due shall be a credit against the 
child support he shall have been ordered to pay. 
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28. The court heard testimony about the possibility 
that bills for psychological counseling and orthodontic care 
remain unpaid, but evidence was not presented as to amounts which 
were sufficient for the court to make a firm determination. 
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, if there are orthodon-
tic bills due which have not been paid by insurance, each of the 
parties shall pay one-half of that unpaid balance and one-half of 
any counseling bills incurred for and on behalf of the children. 
If there is a bill for counseling for the defendant, he shall pay 
it himself. 
29. The defendant is ordered to pay the obligations 
due to MasterCharge and First Security Bank and to hold the 
plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
30. Each of the parties shall assume, pay and hold the 
other harmless from any debts or obligations incurred since their 
separation. 
31. Each of the parties shall assume and pay their own 
costs and fees as incurred in this matter. 
32. The request of the plaintiff that her fees be paid 
by the defendant is denied, as she has substantial resources of 
her own to pay her own fees. 
33. The court determined that there was a dispute 
regarding temporary support. The defendant is ordered to verify 
that all of the checks he testified he has transmitted to the 
plaintiff shall have cleared the bank and been paid to her. If 
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he determines that they have not cleared the bank, then, he is 
ordered to put stop orders against those checks and write 
replacement checks, 
34. Each of the parties is enjoined and prohibited 
from physically abusing, harassing, bothering, or attempting to 
intimidate the other in any way, wherever they may be or reside, 
35. The court, recognizing that the plaintiff claims 
that the military retirement pay of the defendant is an asset 
which should be divided which is disputed by the defendant who 
contends that the fund is an income stream, not an asset because 
it is being paid to him, and that the court has determined that
 n 
the defendant receives $1,484.00 as retirement payI upon which the 
court has set the child support obligation of the defendant in 
light of that obligation as well as the fact that the plaintiff 
has accrued a retirement account through the State of Utah which 
has a present value of $5,129.00 rules final disposition as to an 
award regarding either of the retirement accounts of the parties 
is reserved until the obligation to pay child support terminates. 
36. The court declares that it ^  believes that it has 
divided the property of the parties withj[$87,7u7.00 being awarded 
to the plaintiff andjf $99,913.00 being awarded to the defendant^ 
and the extra amount has been awarded to the defendant for finan-
cial services provided to the plaintiff and the marital estate. 
37. The court has determined that it should award to 
the plaintiff the funds that she has inherited without counting 
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that as part of the marital estate, although the defendant has 
requested that this be included for consideration purposes and 
that part of it, that is, the money that has been earned from the 
inheritancelthrough the management of the defendant be considered 
as a marital asset. 
DATED this l°l 
-£f 
day of 41 SHiA^U^K^-, 1987. 
KEtfNEfrH RIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
H DIXON HIN2LEY 
CLERK 
By -J2* 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of 
Divorce to the following on this //£ ^  day of September, 1987: 
Ms. Barbara Van Asdlan 
1516 South Wasatch Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
DAVID S. D O L O W I T Z ^ 7 
DSD:080487L 
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